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ABSTRACT
Millions of abandoned oil wells are scattered across the United States
(“U.S.”), and many of them continuously leak methane into the air. These
orphaned wells will only grow more common in the U.S. unless
policymakers adopt legal reforms that more adequately hold oil companies
responsible for them. Many of the nation’s existing oil-well-abandonment
regulations are severely outdated, and even those rules often become
unenforceable when oil companies land in bankruptcy court. As a result,
large quantities of methane—a highly potent greenhouse gas—are
constantly escaping into the atmosphere and substantially contributing to
global climate change. This Article examines the regulatory deficiencies
that have led to high rates of oil-well abandonment in the U.S. and
highlights how the oil industry’s political influence has enabled those
deficiencies to persist for decades. The Article then outlines specific policy
strategies and reforms that are capable of proactively addressing the
nation’s ongoing oil-well-abandonment crisis.
INTRODUCTION
The onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in early 2020 led to record low
oil prices in the U.S. as global oil demand and consumption plummeted.1
In January 2020, this downward price trend commenced in China before
spreading across much of the world.2 By March 2020, the plunging

 Both authors were Sustainability Law Student Research Fellows at
ASU’s Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law. Nicole Layton received her J.D. in
2021 at Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University; B.S.
2017, University of Missouri, Chemistry. Ginger Sprong received her J.D. in 2021
at Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University; B.A. 2017,
Southern Methodist University, Environmental Studies. Many thanks to Professor
Troy Rule and our Sustainability Law Research Fellow colleagues for their
invaluable comments and input on the issues covered in this Article.
1. See Alex Dryden, Why Are Oil Prices Negative?, J.P. MORGAN (Apr. 21,
2020), https://am.jpmorgan.com/us/en/asset-management/institutional/insights/
market-insights/market-updates/on-the-minds-of-investors/why-are-oil-prices-ne
gative/ [https://perma.cc/JTC9-BGFE]. West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices
were negative for the first time in history in April 2020. US Oil Prices Turn
Negative as Demand Dries Up, BBC NEWS (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www
.bbc.com/news/business-52350082 [https://perma.cc/53HP-29VV].
2. See Kevin M. Camp et al., From the Barrel to the Pump: The Impact of
the COVID-19 Pandemic on Prices for Petroleum Products, Article in Monthly
Labor Review, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Oct. 30, 2020), https://www.bls.gov
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demand for oil triggered a freefall in oil prices.3 Although market prices
started to rebound by April that same year, the economic damage to the
U.S. oil industry was already done, making it clear that many domestic oil
producers would not recover.4 On June 28, 2020, Chesapeake Energy
Corporation became the highest-valued U.S. oil company to file for
bankruptcy that year with $7 billion in debt.5 The announcement came
mere weeks after Chesapeake paid out $25 million in bonuses to its
executives.6 Chesapeake was only one of several oil companies seeking
bankruptcy protection that year.7
The 2020 spike in oil company bankruptcies subsequently caused a
sharp increase in abandoned oil wells across the U.S., which emit large
amounts of environmentally harmful methane gas into the atmosphere.8
The burden of mitigating these increased emissions may ultimately fall on
taxpayers, as bankruptcy laws sometimes enable oil companies to shed
environmental liabilities for abandoned wells, only to later emerge from
bankruptcy and resume oil extraction while tax-funded agencies clean up
their old wells.9 Certain aspects of bankruptcy proceedings may even
motivate oil companies to delay repairing methane leaks in wells not yet
abandoned.10 Oil-well abandonments before and during bankruptcies not
/opub/mlr/2020/article/from-the-barrel-to-the-pump.htm [https://perma.cc/4LE26LJB].
3. Id.
4. The rebound in oil prices was the product of successful collaboration
between OPEC members and Russia to reduce oil production volume, thereby
balancing supply and demand. Id. The gradual lifting of quarantine and selfisolation restrictions throughout this time also contributed.
5. See Restructuring Information, CHESAPEAKE ENERGY, http://chk.com/
About/restructuring-information [https://perma.cc/WZ7C-W4NN] (last visited
Sept. 13, 2021).
6. Hiroko Tabuchi, From Boom to Busted: Oil Firms Pay Bonuses as They
Hurtle Towards Bankruptcy and Environmental Disaster, STAR TRIBUNE (July
14, 2020), http://e.startribune.com/Olive/ODN/StarTribune/shared/ShowArticle.
aspx?doc=MST%2F2020%2F07%2F14&entity=Ar01902&sk=B7AB4E3B&mo
de=text [https://perma.cc/7779-WGW2].
7. See id. Whiting Petroleum, MDC Energy, and Diamond Offshore Drilling
also declared bankruptcy in 2020 shortly after paying executives millions in
bonuses. Id.
8. Nick Cunningham, Taxpayers Are Footing the Bill for 100-Year Old Oil
Wells, OILPRICE.COM (June 21, 2020, 12:00 PM), https://oilprice.com/Energy/En
ergy-General/Taxpayers-Are-Footing-The-Bill-For-100-Year-Old-Oil-Wells.html
[https://perma.cc/7W9W-J3E5].
9. See id.
10. See Tabuchi, supra note 6.
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only lead to unchecked methane leakage but also often shift the burdens
of plugging abandoned wells and curb their methane emissions onto
taxpayers.11
Failing oil companies’ continued ability to force taxpayers to shoulder
the burdens of unwanted wells largely results from the U.S. oil and gas
industry’s outsized influence on oil industry regulation.12 The industry’s
long-held political strength has enabled it to postpone necessary updates
to oil-well bonding requirements, royalty rates, and other regulations in
ways that increasingly harm the country’s taxpaying citizens and the
natural environment. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code also contributes to this
problem through its inadequate prioritization of oil companies’
environmental protection obligations during bankruptcy because many of
those obligations are not legally categorized as debts.
This Article describes how deficiencies in oil-well and bankruptcy
regulations have led to a proliferation of abandoned and leaking oil wells
throughout the U.S. and identifies specific strategies for reforming these
laws. Part I of this Article provides background information on the
regulatory structure governing oil- and gas-well abandonment within the
U.S. and describes how that structure is leading to troubling amounts of
methane emissions and other adverse environmental impacts. Part II
analyzes several regulatory and bankruptcy law shortcomings that
contribute to the rising number of oil-well abandonments in the U.S. Part
II then examines how the oil industry’s political influence contributes to
these problems and identifies specific policy strategies for addressing
them to ensure oil companies are held more accountable in the future.
I. BACKGROUND
Oil has played a major role in American society for more than a
century from the rise of the gas-powered automobile in the early 1900s to
today’s controversies over the oil industry’s contributions to climate
change. The first oil wells in the U.S. were largely unregulated, and their
potential adverse environmental impacts were not yet understood.
Although oil was first discovered in the U.S. in 1859, oil-well drilling

11. See Cunningham, supra note 8.
12. See, e.g., Hannah J. Wiseman, Taxing Local Energy Externalities, 96
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 563, 582–83 (2020); Inara Scott, The Trouble with
Boycotts: Can Fossil Fuel Divest Campaigns Be Limited, 57 AM. BUS. L.J. 537,
541 (2020); Rachel Richman & Cadmus Wang, Too Open for Business?
Strengthening Long-Term Protections for Federal Lands, 56 IDAHO L. REV. 505,
532–33 (2020).
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regulations were not introduced until the early 1900s.13 Unsurprisingly,
these early regulations focused more on protecting mineral rights and the
integrity and longevity of oil reservoirs than on mitigating environmental
harms.14 Although more environmentally-focused oil extraction rules have
evolved, political and economic pressures have gradually led to the underregulation of certain aspects of oil and gas extraction—including the
growing problem of orphaned oil wells.
A. A Brief History of the Oil and Gas Industry in 2020
The U.S. oil industry has always been prone to tumultuous boom-andbust cycles, and these cycles have long complicated policymakers’ efforts
to fully hold oil companies liable for their environmental impacts. For
more than a century, U.S. oil and gas markets have been notoriously
volatile and unpredictable. Oil companies often have strong incentives to
aggressively invest in drilling and infrastructure when market prices are
high, which makes these companies vulnerable to major financial risks
when prices fall.15 One consequence of this cycle is that when oil
companies become insolvent, they often lack sufficient funds to pay their
liabilities for environmental harms. This risk could very well increase as
the global transition to electric-transportation technologies gradually
diminishes the demand for oil in the coming decades.16
Additionally, growth in the U.S. renewable energy sector is likely to
soften demand for oil and gas over time and put financial pressure on many
oil companies. The nation’s wind- and solar-energy industries, which
account for roughly half of all new electric generating capacity installed
in the country today, continue to experience exponential growth.17 As this
shift continues, long-term demand for oil and gas is forecasted to decrease
13. See E. ALLISON & B. MANDLER, AM. GEOSCIENCES INST., U.S.
REGULATION OF OIL AND GAS OPERATIONS, PETROLEUM AND THE ENVIRONMENT
21-1 (2018), https://www.americangeosciences.org/sites/default/files/AGI_PE_
Regulations_web_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZWG4-XMDL].
14. See id. at 21-2.
15. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-19-615, OIL AND GAS:
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT SHOULD ADDRESS RISKS FROM INSUFFICIENT
BONDS TO RECLAIM WELLS 23–24 (2019), https://www.gao.gov/assets/710
/701450.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7JY-EUN7] [hereinafter GAO-19-615].
16. See Nina Chestney, End New Oil, Gas and Coal Funding to Reach Net
Zero, Says IEA, REUTERS (May 18, 2021, 12:06 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
business/environment/radical-change-needed-reach-net-zero-emissions-iea-2021
-05-18/.
17. See Joshua D. Rhodes, The State of the US Energy Sector, 4 OIL & GAS,
NAT. RES. & ENERGY J. 547, 557 (2018).
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even more.18 The increasing affordability of clean energy technologies and
projected growth in electric vehicle markets point towards a diminished
future for oil.19 The transition from petroleum to renewables, while
desirable in itself, could lead to more abandoned wells and accompanying
methane emissions unless adequate legal safeguards are put in place to
address these trends.
When oil production sites cease operations because of falling demand,
they can create “orphaned” or “abandoned” wells. Texas law defines an
orphaned well as a well that is inactive, non-producing, and has been
dormant for a minimum of 12 months.20 An abandoned well is a well that
either is no longer economically viable for the owner to operate or no
longer produces oil or gas. If left uncapped, faulty equipment, aging
materials, or busted pipes at these wells often leak methane—a potent
greenhouse gas that significantly contributes to climate change and
contaminates land and water. Accordingly, state and federal laws require
oil companies to decommission unused oil wells by properly capping or
plugging them with cement or fly ash to mitigate emissions and other
hazards.21
Unfortunately, oil companies sometimes fail to properly plug or cap a
well after temporarily or permanently ceasing the oil extraction process.
Failure to cap wells became a major problem during the onset of the
COVID-19 pandemic.22 The pandemic unexpectedly shocked the oil
industry and caused several companies to file for bankruptcy and cease
operations.23 As production halted and workers moved out of the oilfields,
many cash-strapped oil companies left wells unplugged or improperly
plugged.24 This most recent spike in abandoned and uncapped wells was
18. See Tabuchi, supra note 6.
19. See Brian M. Fronk, Richard Neal & Srinivas Garimella, Evolution of the
Transition to a World Driven by Renewable Energy, 132 J. ENERGY RES. TECH.
021009 (2010).
20. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.15(a)(1) (2021). While this definition is
specific to Texas, most other states similarly define the term.
21. See Tech. Subgroup, Operations & Env’t Task Grp., Plugging and
Abandonment of Oil and Gas Wells 15 (Nat’l Petrol. Council, Working Paper No.
2-25, 2011), https://www.npc.org/Prudent_Development-Topic_Papers/2-25_
Well_Plugging_and_Abandonment_Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6DN-8JDN].
22. See Nichola Groom, Special Report: Millions of Abandoned Oil Wells
Are Leaking Methane, a Climate Menace, REUTERS (June 16, 2020, 6:14 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-drilling-abandoned-specialreport/specialreport-millions-of-abandoned-oil-wells-are-leaking-methane-a-climate-menaceidUSKBN23N1NL [https://perma.cc/A8ZY-97ZV].
23. See Tabuchi, supra note 6.
24. Id.
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not the nation’s first, and its adverse environmental impacts could persist
for decades. Some orphaned and abandoned wells in the U.S. date back to
oil busts that occurred more than a century ago, and they continue to leak
methane and create environmental risks today.25
B. Orphaned Wells Create Serious Hazards for People and the
Environment
When regulatory structures for oil-well decommissioning fail,
governments and taxpayers are often left to deal with orphaned wells and
the consequences. As stated above, unplugged-orphaned-oil wells leak
methane. Despite drawing less attention than carbon dioxide emissions,
methane emissions have an 86-times-greater global warming impact over
a 20-year period.26 Methane from orphaned-oil wells can also cause
groundwater and surface water contamination.27 Reclaiming well sites
reduces these risks, but failure to do so adversely impacts ecosystems for
many years to come.28
Methane emissions are the second largest contributor to climate
change from human activities.29 With more than 3.2 million abandoned
wells in the U.S. releasing an estimated 281 kilotons of methane annually
into the atmosphere, methane leakage from abandoned wells alone
comprises a significant portion of the country’s total annual contribution
to climate change.30 Some wells emit far more methane than others, and
the level of methane emissions at any given well depends on the well’s
physical characteristics, age, and management.31 Wells that emit large

25. See Cunningham, supra note 8.
26. See Mary Kang et al., Identification and Characterization of High
Methane-Emitting Abandoned Oil and Gas Wells, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS.
13636, 13636 (2016).
27. See, e.g., Mike Soraghan, Baffled About Fracking? You’re Not Alone,
N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/05/13/13
greenwire-baffled-about-fracking-youre-not-alone-44383.html [https://perma.cc/
MM96-J8NL].
28. See GAO-19-615, supra note 15, at 6.
29. See Cameron Rotblat, Caring for the Orphans: Approaches for
Mitigating Fugitive Methane Emissions From Orphaned Oil and Gas Wells, 47
ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10529, 10533 (2017); Greenhouse Gas
Emissions: Overview of Greenhouse Gases, U.S. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://
www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases [https://perma.cc/2 GS2DNK2] (last visited Aug. 31, 2021).
30. See Rotblat, supra note 29, at 10532; see also Groom, supra note 22.
31. See Kang et al., supra note 26, at 13636.
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amounts of methane may even do so continuously for a number of years.32
In addition to being a potent greenhouse gas, the leaked methane can also
contaminate groundwater and land, and some orphaned wells have even
caused major explosions.33
The nation’s oil-well-abandonment problem has existed for decades,
and its costs are increasingly falling onto governments and taxpayers. Old,
abandoned wells are still being identified during the initial bonding
process for new wells or through bankruptcy proceedings, and some of
these orphaned wells are more than 100 years old and lack proper
records.34 Clean-up crews must therefore improvise with the techniques
they use when capping these abandoned and orphaned wells, which
imposes additional costs on taxpayers. In some states where oil and gas
extraction is a major industry, regulators and politicians—recognizing that
these companies likely lack the funds to properly manage and
decommission the wells—have even been accused of encouraging smaller
companies to purchase and develop wells that are reaching their end stages
of production.35
C. The Existing Regulatory Structure for Oil-Well Plugging and
Abandonment
Although state and federal policymakers possess the requisite
regulatory authority to more adequately deter and govern well
abandonment, existing policies have failed to fully address the problem.
Along with other deficiencies, most existing policies do not account for
the potential long-term impacts of methane emissions on climate change.36
Despite widespread scientific knowledge that methane contributes to
climate change, only recently have states attempted to curb emissions from
oil wells.37 At the federal level, the Trump Administration in 2020 rolled

32. See id. at 13637.
33. A construction site explosion in California was the result of methane from
a leaking well accumulating at the site. See Groom, supra note 22.
34. Matt Bloom, Cleaning Up Abandoned Wells Proves Costly to Gas and
Oil Producing States, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 6, 2019, 4:23 PM), https://www
.npr.org/2019/09/06/758284873/cleaning-up-abandoned-wells-proves-costly-togas-and-oil-producing-states [https://perma.cc/S9Z9-Q99E].
35. See Christopher S. Kulander, Surface Damages, Site-Remediation and
Well Bonding in Wyoming-Results and Analysis of Recent Regulations, 9 WYO.
L. REV. 413, 442 (2009).
36. Rotblat, supra note 29, at 10535.
37. In 2014, Colorado became the first state to enact legislation limiting
methane emissions from oil and gas production and requiring such companies to
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back an Obama-era regulation that required oil companies to monitor and
limit methane leaks from their wells.38 The Trump Administration’s
replacement rule eliminated the federal requirement that these companies
must use technologies to detect methane leaks based upon the presumption
that most oil companies could not afford the compliance costs associated
with the previous regulation.39 The Biden Administration recommitted the
U.S. to certain environmental treaties and stopped allowing new oil wells
on federal land leases shortly after Biden transitioned into office.
However, methane emission regulations at the federal level remained
unsatisfactory—especially when viewed through a long-term climate
policy lens.40
Operators who drill oil wells in the U.S. are legally obligated to follow
certain plugging and abandonment (“P&A”) regulations after a well’s
productive or profitable life, but these regulations inadequately address the
nation’s orphaned wells problem. The U.S. Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) regulates oil wells on federal public lands and lands held in federal
trust, while state agencies regulate oil wells on privately-owned and stateowned land within their respective borders. The BLM and state agencies
both require oil companies to post a decommissioning bond for each well
or group of wells they dig.41 Unfortunately, the amounts of these bonds are
significantly lower than what is needed to fully reimburse government
agencies for the costs of plugging abandoned wells.

fix methane leaks from existing operations. See 5 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1001-9
Part F (2021); see also Stephanie Paige Ogburn, Colorado First State to Limit
Methane Pollution from Oil and Gas Wells, SCI. AM. (Feb. 25, 2014), https://
www.scientificamerican.com/article/colorado-first-state-to-limit-methane-pollut
ion-from-oil-and-gas-wells/ [https://perma.cc/Z52E-MGQA].
38. Coral Davenport, E.P.A. to Lift Obama-Era Controls on Methane, a
Potent Greenhouse Gas, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2020), https://nytimes.com/20
20/08/10/climate/trump-methane-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/K32RPNK4].
39. Valerie Volcovici & Timothy Gardner, Trump Administration Rolls Back
Curbs on Oil Industry Methane Emissions, REUTERS (Aug. 13, 2020, 6:07 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-epa-methane/trump-administration-rollsback-curbs-on-oil-industry-methane-emissions-idUSKCN2591JJ [https://perma.
cc/VG78-QC9L].
40. See Exec. Order No. 14,008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7619 (Jan. 27, 2021); see also
Dino Grandoni, The Energy 202: Biden Administration Puts Freeze on Federal
Fossil Fuel Leases and Permits, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2021, 8:43 AM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/01/22/energy-202-biden-administration
-puts-freeze-federal-fossil-fuel-leases-permits/ [https://perma.cc/SZB3-9V2H].
41. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3104.1–.3 (2021); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-104 (2021).
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1. Existing Well-Plugging Requirements
Although current state and federal regulations require the plugging of
abandoned wells in many jurisdictions, these rules often fall short in
ensuring that oil companies will promptly follow through with their
obligations. Under certain temporary-abandonment rules, federal laws
sometimes permit oil companies to delay well-plugging. Federal oil
lessees are legally obligated to “promptly plug and abandon” wells once
production of oil is no longer profitable.42 However, under BLM oversight,
federal oil lessees may temporarily abandon a well for up to 24 months
before beginning their plugging operations.43 During these delay periods,
wells can leak methane and other environmental pollutants while
remaining largely unmonitored. Moreover, at the expiration of the 24month period, well operators ought to either resume operations or properly
cap and/or plug the well before permanently abandoning it. This is not
always the case though as transferring a temporarily abandoned well to a
new operator can extend this delay period even longer.44 Further delay
occurs because the first operator’s abandonment does not necessarily
preclude the new operator from seeking temporary-abandonment rights.45
Because of these and other regulatory loopholes, wells on federal lands
may be left unplugged and subsequently leak methane for extended
periods of time without violating federal regulations.
State-level P&A requirements vary greatly, partly depending on the
strength of the oil industry within that state. In Texas, plugging operations
must begin on an inactive well after one year without drilling.46 However,
a third-party operator is allowed to take over an inactive well during this
time and start the clock over, or they may pay a small permit fee that
precludes an abandonment finding and thereby allows further avoidance
of well-capping enforcement.47
Similarly, in North Dakota, a well is considered “abandoned” if it has
not produced oil within at least one year.48 State regulations require
42. 43 C.F.R § 3162.3-4(a).
43. See id. § 3162.3-4(c).
44. See id. § 3162.3.
45. See id. §§ 3216.3, 3162.3-4(c).
46. See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.14(b)(2) (2021).
47. See id. § 3.15(f).
48. Amy R. Sisk, Landowners, Oil Companies Support Plugging Abandoned
Wells but Want Concerns Addressed, BISMARCK TRIB. (June 10, 2020), https://
bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/govt-and-politics/landowners-oilcompanies-support-plugging-abandoned-wells-but-want-concerns-addressed/art
icle_3fa707fa-89a4-52e1-a7ae-7e5dd9fc80b0.html [https://perma.cc/H5KS-HP85].
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companies to either permanently plug or restart any well that has remained
idle for a year. Despite this regulatory policy, the wells identified by the
North Dakota Oil and Gas Division are older wells that were drilled during
oil booms in past decades.49
Wyoming P&A requirements first necessitate an inability to find a
responsible party to plug and abandon the well—either due to bankruptcy
or to lack of operations by the party within the state.50 Only after the state
designates a well as abandoned can the Wyoming Oil and Gas
Commission step in to enforce regulations. This structure, where
enforcement for P&A is triggered only after a company has filed for
bankruptcy or left the state, makes it relatively easy for oil companies to
evade responsibility for their wells after oil extraction activities are
concluded.
2. Oil-Well-Decommissioning Bond Requirements
Oil-well-decommissioning bonds have existed for decades, but the
bond amounts required today are often too low to fully cover the costs of
well-plugging. The BLM and various state agencies first implemented oilwell bonds in the 1950s and 1960s, and they have consistently enforced
those bonds as a permitting requirement for new oil-well projects.51 Both
federal and state regulatory systems allow for two types of bonds: singlewell bonds and blanket bonds. A single-well bond covers a single well. By
contrast, a blanket bond is a larger-dollar bond intended to cover a
collection of wells.52 Typically when blanket bonds are used today, they
are supposed to provide for the P&A costs of all covered wells should the
oil company posting the bond fail to meet decommissioning requirements
and become insolvent.
Although oil-well bonds were intended to fully cover the cost of
plugging a well, other policy priorities and political pressures have
gradually weakened the bond’s ability to serve its intended function. The
Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission (IOGCC) continues to assert
state-level bonds should provide financial assurance that well-plugging
and site-reclamation funds will be available for orphaned wells;
hdfowever that expectation is rarely met.53 Bonds should also indirectly

49. See id.
50. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1206 (2021).
51. See GAO-19-615, supra note 15, at 16.
52. See Kulander, supra note 35, at 419.
53. See INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM’N, IDLE AND ORPHAN OIL
AND GAS WELLS: STATE AND PROVINCIAL REGULATORY STRATEGIES 17 (2020),
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reduce the costs borne by taxpayers to fund state or federal government
efforts to step in and plug orphaned wells.54 Unfortunately, the minimum
bond amounts set in the 1950s and 1960s have not been adequately
adjusted over time to account for changes in costs, damages, or inflation,
so they provide minimal mitigation of the burden on taxpayers to fund
government P&A efforts.55
Unfortunately, some evidence exists that governments’ failures to
increase bond amounts over time is intentional due to a fear that oil
companies cannot comply with higher amounts. For instance, a
Government Accountability Office report found that some BLM officials
generally did not want to require full liability bonds because they feared
oil and gas companies would not have the liquidity to pay the bonds and
simultaneously cover their operating costs.56 By prioritizing continued oil
production over environmental protection, leadership within this major
federal agency responsible for managing and protecting public lands has
exacerbated the nation’s current orphaned-wells problem.
The gap between federal bond amounts and actual oil-well-plugging
costs has only widened over the past few decades. The BLM authorizes
three categories of bonds: single lease, statewide, and nationwide bonds.57
Although the specific amount of a bond is set by a contract between the
BLM and the oil company, there are established minimums for each bond
category.58 Incredibly, these federal bond minimums have not changed
since 1960.59 As a result, the BLM on average holds a bond of only $890
https://iogcc.ok.gov/sites/g/files/gmc836/f/documents/2021/2020_03_04_update
d_idle_and_orphan_oil_and_gas_wells_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DFG-4NLR].
54. See GAO-19-615, supra note 15, at 10 (“If operators do not reclaim their
wells, BLM may redeem the certificate of deposit, cash the check, sell the
security, or make a demand on the letter of credit to pay the reclamation costs.”).
55. See id. at 16.
56. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-250, BUREAU OF LAND
MANAGEMENT NEEDS TO IMPROVE ITS DATA AND OVERSIGHT OF ITS POTENTIAL
LIABILITIES 29 (2018), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/691810.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/E6QW-GC37].
57. See GAO-19-615, supra note 15, at 7–8.
58. See id. at 2. The current BLM minimum bond amounts are $10,000 for
all wells on a single lease; $25,000 for all wells on federally managed land within
one state; and $150,000 for all wells nationwide. The statewide and nationwide
bond minimums were set in 1951, and the individual lease bond minimum was
set in 1960. Id.
59. See id. at GAO Highlights (“Bonds generally do not reflect reclamation
costs because most bonds are set at their regulatory minimum values, and these
minimums have not been adjusted since the 1950s and 1960s to account for
inflation . . . .”).
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to $2,691 per oil well it regulates.60 Well-plugging costs can vary widely,
but even the most inexpensive well-plugging jobs tend to cost more than
$2,691 per well, and plugging the most expensive wells costs far more
than any bond minimum.61 Of course, when unplugged-oil wells become
orphaned and bonds are insufficient to cover P&A costs, the BLM must
rely on taxpayer funding to plug the wells.62 This dilemma, along with a
lack of government funding, has led to an ever-increasing backlog of
unplugged-orphaned-oil wells across the country.63
Additionally, at the state level, oil-well bonding requirements have
become increasingly inadequate at assuring the timely plugging or capping
of abandoned wells. Most states require operators to post financial
assurance bonds for oil wells before drilling may begin.64 In states such as
Texas and North Dakota where oil extraction has historically served as a
major economic driver, these bonding requirements have unfortunately
done little to curtail the accumulation of orphaned wells.65 This is because
oil companies are allowed to use inexpensive blanket bonds to cover
multiple wells under one bond posting.
In Texas, for instance, bonding requirements are far too low to finance
state agencies’ efforts to remediate abandoned sites. Due in part to Texas’s
lack of a compulsory unitization statute to naturally limit how many wells
60. See id. at 12 (“As of 2018, individual lease bonds had the highest average
bond value per well at $2,691, and nationwide bonds had the lowest average bond
per well value at $890. Statewide bonds had an average bond value per well of
$1,592.”).
61. In 2019, the United States Government Accountability Office reported
that estimated reclamation costs of oil wells on federal land range from $3,096 to
$603,000 per well. See id. at 6 n.15.
62. See id. at GAO Highlights (“[W]hen wells are not properly managed, the
federal government may end up paying to clean up the wells when they stop
producing. Specifically, wells on federal lands that an operator does not reclaim
and for which there are no other liable parties fall to BLM to reclaim (restore lands
to as close to their original natural states as possible). These wells become
orphaned if the operator’s bond held by BLM is not sufficient to cover reclamation
costs.”).
63. The true number of orphaned wells cannot be accurately quantified, as
some orphaned wells that have been found are over 100 years old, dating back to
a time when wells were unregulated and often unrecorded. This also means
potential uncertainty in whether the BLM or a state agency should be responsible
for attempting to plug an abandoned well. See Bloom, supra note 34.
64. See Rotblat, supra note 29, at 10533.
65. See Jacqueline S. Ho et al., Managing Environmental Liability: An
Evaluation of Bonding Requirements for Oil and Gas Wells in the United States,
52 ENV’T. SCI. & TECH. 52, 3908 (2018).

14

CUT AND RUN

[Vol. X

or pumps are drilled, Texas leads the nation in abandoned wells.66 Texas
law allows for blanket bonds to cover multiple wells, with the broadest
blanket bond requiring a mere $250,000 to cover 100 or more wells.67
Alternatively, operators may opt for single-well bonds, which equate to
about $2 per foot of total well depth.68 Neither of these bonds are even
remotely high enough to cover the costs of plugging wells when site
owners or operators abandon them.
Bond requirements in North Dakota fare slightly better than those in
Texas but ultimately still fail to adequately serve their intended purpose.
For a single well in North Dakota, the minimum bond amount is $50,000.69
However, for a blanket bond—which the state allows to cover up to six
wells—the required bond amount is only $100,000.70 This means that for
each well in a six-well blanket bond, only $16,700 is allocated for P&A
purposes. This low figure is just one-tenth of the actual average cost to
reclaim a site and plug a well in the state.71 In a few states, including North
Dakota and Texas, statutes enable state agencies to sue oil companies to
recover unbonded costs spent on capping a well.72 However, pursuing that
remedy is typically only effective if the offending oil company remains
solvent and has not sought bankruptcy protection.73
66. Compulsory unitization would require all holders of property rights
within one oil field to effectively operate as a single unit. This strategy has been
shown to both increase efficiency in oil recovery and prevent excessive waste, in
part by disincentivizing the drilling of excessive numbers of wells. Despite these
advantages leading all other states to implement compulsory unitization, Texas
lawmakers have continuously refused to adopt such a policy. See Matthew K.
Trawick, Note, Cooperative Mineral Interest Development in the Lone Star State:
It's Time to Mess with Texas, 4 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 385, 398–99 (2015).
67. See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.78(g)(1)(B) (2021).
68. See id. § 3.78(a).
69. N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-15 (2020).
70. See id.
71. The North Dakota State Mineral Resources Director Lynn Helms
estimates that “the cost of plugging and reclaiming a site [in North Dakota]
averages about $150,000.” When a company has a six-well blanket bond of only
$100,000 to cover all six wells, the amount divided between each well equates to
the low percentile of approximately one-tenth the actual amount needed to recover
the site. See James Macpherson, North Dakota Aims to Use COVID-19 Aid to
Plug Oil Wells, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 14, 2020, 3:47 PM), https://www.us
news.com/news/best-states/north-dakota/articles/2020-05-14/north-dakota-aimsto-use-covid-19-aid-to-plug-oil-wells.
72. See Alan Hager & Kevin L. Shaw, Idle and Deserted Wells: Who Plugs
and Who Pays?, 45 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 12-1 (1999).
73. See id.
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One factor contributing to the perpetuation of lax state-level bonding
requirements is the political pressure government officials feel to preserve
the competitiveness of a state’s oil industry and thereby secure the
economic benefits the industry provides. State regulators sometimes fear
if they increase bond requirements, oil companies will respond by ceasing
operations within the state.74 Accordingly, some large U.S. oil companies
have successfully leveraged their economic influence to preserve less
stringent bonding requirements to protect their profits while exposing the
state to environmental risks.
D. Inadequate Priority in Bankruptcy Proceedings
The inadequacy of oil-well bonding requirements is particularly
problematic because there is no guarantee an insolvent oil company’s
P&A obligations will survive a bankruptcy proceeding. Existing P&A
regulations were generally created based on the assumption that oil
companies that abandoned their wells would be solvent and thus capable
of paying to clean up their messes.75 However, well-plugging obligations
are seldom classifiable as claims a bankruptcy court must prioritize over
other classes of debtor obligations.
Of the six types of bankruptcy proceedings authorized under the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code, only Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 proceedings are
generally available to oil companies. Oil companies that file for Chapter 7
bankruptcy protection become subject to a process of liquidating their
assets to pay off debts, which is carried out by an appointed bankruptcy
trustee.76 In Chapter 7 bankruptcy, debt repayment may be limited by
claim priorities and a debtor’s asset exemptions.77 Claim priority rules, set
out in 11 U.S. Code section 726 as “classes” of claims, are an important
area of focus in the context of oil company bankruptcies. Each of the six
classes of bankruptcy claims must be fully paid before the bankruptcy

74. See Zack Colman, 'Orphaned' Oil Wells to Squeeze State Coffers,
POLITICO (May 12, 2020, 1:54 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/
11/orphaned-oil-wells-to-squeeze-state-coffers-249138 [https://perma.cc/26HHCYQT].
75. See GAO-19-615, supra note 15 (explaining that regulators failed for
decades to adjust bond minimums for inflations, leading to the current crisis of
government agencies becoming responsible for well clean up).
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 959(b).
77. See generally 11 U.S.C. §§ 723–727.
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trustee may begin paying claims in the next-lower class.78 The first class
of claims gives priority to potential government and administrative
expense claims.79 However, there are strict guidelines governing which
administrative expenses and government claims may qualify for this high
prioritization.80
Companies declaring Chapter 11 bankruptcy undergo reorganization
of their business and debts in an effort to regain solvency.81 Oil companies
declaring Chapter 11 bankruptcies are subject to closer scrutiny by
bankruptcy courts than those that undergo Chapter 7 bankruptcies because,
in Chapter 11 proceedings, courts have the power to place certain
limitations on business operations or on the retention of certain property
while the reorganization plan is pending.82 A Chapter 11 bankruptcy court
is also responsible for enforcing and allowing exceptions to the automatic
stay placed on debt collection activities when a company files for
bankruptcy.83 Once all legal requirements are satisfied and any objections
have been heard, a Chapter 11 court confirms the company’s
reorganization plan (or sometimes a Chapter 11 liquidation plan).84 A
confirmed plan designates the types and classes of claims and interests for
treatment under the reorganization structure.85
In both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcies, the court has the
power to influence how, when, and if various claims—including wellplugging obligations—are paid by the debtor.86 Because of the Bankruptcy
Code’s lack of clarity with regard to oil-well-plugging obligations,
bankruptcy courts are largely responsible for interpreting which particular
classifications should apply to a well-plugging-related claim. For instance,
in the 1998 case of Texas v. Lowe, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit found that Texas’s costs of plugging oil wells should be
78. See id. § 726; see also Jeffrey S. Theuer, Aligning Environmental Policy
and Bankruptcy Protection: Who Pays for Environmental Claims Under the
Bankruptcy Code?, 13 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 465, 476 (1996).
79. See 11 U.S.C § 507(a)(2), (8).
80. See Mary J. Koks & Tim Million, Environmental Issues in Bankruptcy,
40 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 43, 46 (2009).
81. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123.
82. Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106, 1108, with 11 U.S.C. § 704. Chapter 11
trustees have far more extensive duties to the court than do Chapter 7 trustees, and
Chapter 11 trustees are accountable for maintaining business operations during
the pendency of bankruptcy proceedings whereas Chapter 7 trustees are primarily
responsible for winding down business operations to prepare for liquidation.
83. See Theuer, supra note 78, at 487–88.
84. See Koks & Million, supra note 80, at 44.
85. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(1).
86. See id. §§ 502–503.
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awarded “administrative expense” claim priority.87 Prior to that decision,
P&A costs were rarely given this high-priority designation during
bankruptcy proceedings.88 Even after Texas v. Lowe, however, bankruptcy
judges maintain considerable discretion when weighing the necessary
factors to determine which environmental claims receive priority.89 Judges
also have discretion in determining which debts, if any, are
“dischargeable” and thus release a debtor from that particular liability.90
For example, in the environmental law context, if a state or federal agency
submits a clean-up order for an abandoned well site, that order may be
converted into an obligation dischargeable in bankruptcy.91 The
considerable discretion afforded to bankruptcy judges can have major
impacts when an insolvent oil company fails to plug several wells and
consequentially seeks bankruptcy protection.
II. ANALYSIS
As described in Part I, the existing regulatory structure governing the
management of oil wells in the U.S. fails to adequately guard the nation
against associated environmental harms. Current bonding requirements for
oil wells are artificially low in many jurisdictions, and debtors’ wellplugging obligations are not sufficiently prioritized in bankruptcy
proceedings. Consequently, it is far too easy for oil companies to avoid
these obligations, and the financial risks and responsibilities for wellplugging fall too heavily on governments and taxpayers. The current
87. See Texas v. Lowe (In re H.L.S. Energy Co.), 151 F.3d 434, 436 (5th Cir.
1998).
88. The court in Texas v. Lowe relied upon Reading Co. v. Brown, a case from
1968 that defined what an “actual and necessary” expense was in order to grant
administrative priority to that debt. In doing so, the court quoted Reading, which
stated that it was “sounder to treat tort claims arising during [a bankruptcy] as
actual and necessary expenses” than it would be to afford the same categorization
to pre-existing debts of the bankrupt [like P&A costs are]. See id. at 437 (citing
Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471, 483 (1968)). Though the court referenced
this case, it held that P&A costs did qualify as administrative expenses and
granted that priority on this occasion. See id. at 439.
89. See id. at 436, 439. Texas v. Lowe makes it clear that the definition of
what qualifies as an administrative expense is fluid and fact-specific. This court
itself even refrained from determining whether post-petition P&A costs qualified
and only characterized the pre-petition debts as such. See id.
90. See 7 U.S.C. § 727, on the types of debts that may be dischargeable. See
also 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (discussing the effect of a judge approving a liquidation
plan).
91. See, e.g., Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 275 (1985).
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regulatory system governing oil-well decommissioning creates a moral
hazard by excessively shielding oil companies from financial risks
associated with their actions. It also fails to correct the problems associated
with oil companies internalizing the full social costs of orphaned wells.
Fortunately, as political support for climate change remediation grows
under this new presidential administration, new opportunities to overcome
the political rent seeking and regulatory capture problems that have long
perpetuated these policy failures are coming into existence. Ideally, this
support will spark reform of well-abandonment laws and trigger the
institution of more effective regulatory structures.92
Negative externality problems arise in the oil-well decommissioning
context whenever an oil company is able to avoid bearing the full cost of
its failure to plug an abandoned well. In short, unless oil companies
internalize the costs they impose on society from such actions, they are
incentivized to under-protect against well-abandonment-related risks.93
The regulatory structures currently in place throughout much of the U.S.—
with their inadequate bonding requirements and soft bankruptcy
provisions for oil companies—have created market failure within the oil
industry. These existing regulatory regimes have also produced moral
hazard problems. Namely, some oil companies drill excessive numbers of
wells without adequate funding reserved to plug them because of a reliance
on the protection afforded to them by the Bankruptcy Code against the
consequences of such risky actions.94
To correct the deficiencies in the state and federal regulations, which
have fueled the nation’s orphaned-oil-well problem, policymakers must
find ways to ensure oil companies internalize more of the costs of
92. On his Inauguration Day in 2021, President Biden rejoined the Paris
Climate Agreement through Executive Order. Other environmental Executive
Orders since signed have already strengthened methane emissions standards in
the U.S., although rent-seeking activities and political influence by oil industry
stakeholders have continued to keep state and federal bonding requirements
excessively low. See Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global
Environmental Regulation, 87 GEO. L.J. 749, 754–58 (1999) (describing political
rent seeking in the environmental context).
93. See Richard A. Epstein, Positive and Negative Externalities in Real
Estate Development, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1493, 1496–97 (2018).
94. See Mollie Lee, Environmental Economics: A Market Failure Approach
to the Commerce Clause, 116 YALE L.J. 456, 477–80 (2006) (“From an economic
perspective, environmental damage can often be explained as the inefficient use
of environmental goods due to market failure . . . . The public good nature of many
environmental assets is another cause of environmental market failures . . . . [T]he
net effect of a series of decisions can lead to unsustainable use that has both public
and private consequences.”).
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abandoned wells and bear more of the financial risks associated with well
abandonment. The following subsections contain several potential policy
strategies aimed at reforming oil-well-abandonment laws with these
primary goals in mind.
A. Bonding Requirement Increases and Other Risk Reallocation
Strategies
One obvious strategy for ensuring oil companies internalize more of
the costs of well-plugging is to significantly increase minimum
decommissioning bond amounts for oil wells across the country. Such
bond increases would mitigate the negative externality problems
associated with well drilling by ensuring oil companies bear more of the
abandonment costs up front. Increasing bond requirements could also help
limit the moral hazard problems associated with well abandonment by
exposing oil companies to the inevitable financial consequences following
risky oil-well-development behavior.
In addition to raising minimum bond amounts, policymakers can
attempt to mitigate these problems by collecting more P&A funds from oil
companies while the companies are still solvent. Reforms and expansions
of pre-production P&A funding programs could help ensure that state and
federal agencies have a greater requisite funding available for P&A when
wells are orphaned by bankrupt companies. New built-in mechanisms,
such as periodic inflation adjustments, can ensure that the actual P&A
costs are reflected in bonding fee structures over time. However, updating
bond minimums to more effectively serve their intended function requires
more than simply adjusting bonds based on the inflation rate. In recent
decades, the oil industry’s rent-seeking activities stifled efforts to
introduce more appropriate bonding policies.95 Ideally, governments
would resist this influence and more intently take market conditions and
rising prices of materials into account when setting and adjusting preproduction oil drilling fees over time. Instead, the trend often maintains a
strategy of attempting to collect these rising costs from oil companies that
have already declared bankruptcy.96

95. See, e.g., Groom, supra note 22 (“Oil-industry lobbyists have been
fighting state and federal efforts to increase the bonding, arguing it would hurt
jobs and economic growth during an already tough time for the industry.”).
96. See Hager & Shaw, supra note 72.
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1. Allocating More Royalties to Well-Plugging Funds
Two straightforward ways to increase solvent oil companies’
contributions to government P&A work are to either increase oil
production royalty rates or allocate more of all collected royalties directly
to oil-well P&A funds. In 2019 alone, the federal government collected
approximately $2.931 billion in oil royalties from federal lands.97 Texas,
the nation’s leading state in oil production, separately collected
approximately $2.2 billion in state-level oil royalties.98 Like all other oil
and gas policies, federal and state royalty collection rates vary greatly as
do the rules for allocating those revenues. At least at the federal level,
however, the royalty rate set in a lease agreement may only be adjusted
downward and never upward.99 Accordingly, collecting additional
royalties under existing federal oil and gas leases to help fund P&A would
be difficult. This industry-friendly prohibition on upward adjustments of
royalty rates is particularly concerning as the BLM’s standard royalty rate
is just 12.5%, an amount that has remained unchanged since 1920.100
Texas, by contrast, currently has an average royalty rate of 20–25% despite
its regulatory minimum rate being 12.5%.101
Another likely obstacle to allocating royalties to P&A funds is that
most states’ royalty revenues are already earmarked for other purposes.
Texas, among other states, currently uses royalty revenues as a major
funding source for public education.102 For Texas alone, this amounted to
97. See BRANDON S. TRACY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46537, REVENUES AND
DISBURSEMENTS FROM OIL AND NATURAL GAS PRODUCTION ON FEDERAL LANDS
13 (2020), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46537 [https://perma.cc/
D34U-8QHK].
98. See TEX. OIL & GAS ASS’N, ANNUAL ENERGY & ECONOMIC IMPACT
REPORT 2019 3 (2020), http://docs.txoga.org/files/1464-economic-impact-report1.14.20.pdf [https://perma.cc/YHQ3-CG8U].
99. See 30 C.F.R. § 1202.52 (2021).
100. See Nicole Gentile, Federal Oil and Gas Royalty and Revenue Reform,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 19, 2015, 12:01 AM), https://www.americanpro
gress.org/issues/green/reports/2015/06/19/115580/federal-oil-and-gas-royalty-an
d-revenue-reform/ [https://perma.cc/3MQE-PURS]; see also 43 C.F.R. § 3103.3-1.
101. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 52.022 (Vernon 1993); see also
Overview, TEX. GEN. LAND OFF., https://www.glo.texas.gov/energy-business/oilgas/mineral-leasing/overview/index.html [https://perma.cc/MP5S-P6SN] (last
visited Sept. 6, 2021).
102. See Edith Camargo-Renteria, Texas Oil and Gas Industry Breaks
Historical Records, Fills State Coffers, ENERGY DEPTH TEX. (Jan. 17, 2020),
https://www.energyindepth.org/texas-oil-and-gas-industry-breaks-historical-record
s-fill s-state-coffers/ [https://perma.cc/FX3G-BW9V].
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$2.1 billion in 2019.103 Tying public education funding to the oil industry
surely increases regulatory capture risks for oil companies in the state.
Boom-and-bust oil towns like those in western Texas that use tax revenue
and royalties for their education system would likely prefer that the money
goes to their budgets rather than toward plugging abandoned wells.
A strategy to redirect more federal oil royalties toward P&A funding
would face similar politically motivated challenges. Royalties collected by
the Office of Natural Resources Revenue are disbursed to a variety of
parties and interests, including states, the Reclamation Fund, the BLM
Permit Processing Improvement Fund (“PPIF”), and the Treasury General
Fund (“TGF”).104 The Reclamation Fund was established in 1902 to
support irrigation systems in western states and is completely unrelated to
oil-well reclamation efforts.105 To reallocate federal oil royalties to P&A
funding, the path of least resistance may lie in reducing disbursements to
the TGF. As the name suggests, revenues placed in the TGF are not
earmarked for any specific purpose, so their allocation should not generate
contentious debates comparable to those surrounding Texas’s public
education funding. In 2019, approximately $444 million was disbursed to
the TGF from oil royalties.106 Reallocating some percentage of such
revenues to a specific P&A fund rather than the TGF, while not a complete
solution, would be a productive start toward raising the substantial funding
needed to plug orphaned wells on federal lands across the country.
2. Creating Additional Fees to Fund Well-Plugging
Adding new standard provisions to future federal oil and gas leases
requiring periodic P&A-fund fee payments could serve as another efficient
mechanism to collect the requisite funding from oil companies. Funds
generated from such fees could be specifically allocated to cover future
P&A costs inherited by the federal government from bankrupt oil
companies. Industry resistance to these new fees may be mitigated if a
portion of the fee was refundable once an oil company properly plugged
and decommissioned its wells. Such an approach may potentially deter oil
companies from evading P&A responsibilities.
One strategy proposed by the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) is to raise P&A funding amounts by introducing one-time or

103.
104.
105.
106.

See id.
See TRACY, supra note 97, at 15.
See id. at 10 n.47.
See id. at 15.
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conditional oil-drilling fee structures for that purpose.107 The GAO,
arguing that the BLM has the authority to impose and collect such fees
under the Energy Policy Act of 2005—a claim the BLM openly disputes—
has recommended to both increase drilling application fees and to assess a
new annual fee on inactive wells.108 According to the GAO, implementing
these fees could raise enough funds to plug existing orphaned wells and
at-risk wells in approximately ten years.109 However, calls for such an
approach would surely face strong political opposition from the oil
industry. Relying solely on this approach would likewise preclude the
federal government from getting ahead of the pace of wells becoming
orphaned, especially in the wake of 2020’s influx of orphaned wells and
the potential for many more due to the impending energy transition. Such
a one-time fee would also fail to prevent new wells from becoming
orphaned or provide a sustainable source of income for oil companies or
the appropriate regulatory body to address the issue over the long term.110
A combination of new drilling application fees and periodic fees based
on a well’s “active” status could create a greater capacity to collect the
necessary funding. Drilling application fees, as suggested by the GAO,
would be immediately payable to the BLM for plugging already-orphaned
wells.111 Then, if a fee of a few hundred dollars per year was assessed on
each active well and placed into a trust, contingency funds could
107. See GAO-19-615, supra note 15, at 22 (“According to BLM data, the
agency processes more than 3,500 applications to drill each year, on average, and
has over 14,000 inactive wells. Based on our calculations, a separate fee of about
$1,300 charged at the time a drilling application is submitted (in addition to the
current drilling application filing fee, which is $10,050), or an annual fee of less
than $350 for inactive wells could generate enough revenue to cover, in a little
over a decade, the entire $46 million potential reclamation costs field offices
identified to us.”).
108. Id. at 21–22 (“The Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) directs
Interior to establish a program that, among other things, provides for the
identification and recovery of reclamation costs from persons or other entities
currently providing a bond or other financial assurance for an oil or gas well that
is orphaned, abandoned, or idled…In commenting on a draft of this report, BLM
stated that it does not have the authority to seek or collect fees from lease operators
to reclaim orphaned wells.”).
109. See id. at 22.
110. See id. The one-time fee suggested by the BLM would help reclaim old
wells, but the backlog of existing orphaned wells is considerable. Likely, a onetime fee would be unable to prevent new wells from becoming orphaned based
upon these pre-existing abandoned wells, and the funds would run out before any
newer abandoned wells could be addressed.
111. See id.
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accumulate and help cover the costs of decommissioning future orphaned
wells.
3. Implementing New Bond Minimums and Eliminating Blanket
Bonds
Discontinuing the option of blanket bonds for all new oil-drilling
permits would further address the externality and moral hazard problems
that contribute to the high rates of oil-well abandonment. Blanket bonds
rarely account for the full cost of reclaiming every well covered. Some
states even allow for blanket bonds not calibrated based on the number of
wells and instead use broad categories ranging from one to ten wells, ten
to one hundred wells, and so on.112 This imprecise bonding approach
magnifies moral hazards as oil companies know they likely will never have
to pay the full cost to remediate sites if excessive risk-taking ultimately
plunges them into insolvency. Increasing minimum bond amounts can be
an effective strategy only if such amounts are high enough to cover P&A
expenses for every well under a given bond. Achieving this objective
without discontinuing the use of blanket bonds will be very difficult. North
Dakota is currently the only state that even sets a limit on the number of
wells their statewide bonds can cover—up to six. However, oil companies
operating in North Dakota may still purchase as many six well bonds as
they desire.113 The BLM and other states currently have no such limits in
place. Eliminating blanket-bond structures and mandating single-well
bonds would create a relatively simple way to address this under-bonding
problem.
State blanket bonds have proven to be inadequate in mitigating the
Bankruptcy Code’s shortcomings in addressing abandoned wells. For
example, in Texas, a blanket bond for a small oil producer with ten or
fewer wells is just $25,000, yet actual P&A costs have an estimated
average of between $20,000–$30,000 per well.114 Even more concerning
are Texas’s laws allowing for blanket bonds of just $250,000 for oil
companies with 100 or more wells.115 Under such laws, Texas oil
producers that operate over 100 wells can do so while posting a total bond
amount capable of covering P&A costs for only about 12 abandoned
112. See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.78(g)(1)(B) (2021).
113. See N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-02-03-15.2 (2020).
114. See TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.78(g)(1)(B); see also It’s Closing Time: The
Huge Bill to Abandon Oilfields Comes Early, CARBON TRACKER INITIATIVE 10
(2020), https://carbontracker.org/reports/its-closing-time/ [https://perma.cc/JJ9BUBKJ].
115. See TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.78(g)(1)(B)(iii).
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wells.116 Wyoming’s blanket-bonding scheme is even more troublesome
because it allows a single bond amounting to just $100,000 to cover as
many wells as needed, regardless of depth or type.117
In light of the many disadvantages, blanket-bonding schemes ideally
would be phased out and ultimately replaced with single-well bonding
requirements with minimum amounts that cover the full reclamation and
capping costs for every well. Such an updated scheme would also adjust
minimum bonding amounts for inflation and possibly even follow the
Wyoming model of adjusting every three years. Most states set single-well
bonds at specific dollar amounts per foot, ranging from $2 in Texas to $10
in Wyoming.118 Setting such amounts to continuously ensure adequate
decommissioning funds are available for every well—though surely an
unpopular proposition among oil companies—would act as a valuable
guarantee the oil companies, and not taxpayers, pay to cap every well.
At the federal level, the BLM likewise should face the reality that
nationwide blanket bonds are not a viable approach to securing adequate
P&A funds. As of 2001, 65 of the 77 companies with nationwide bonds
for production on Indian trust lands alone did not have adequate coverage
for their wells.119 Further, across those 77 blanket bonds, a liability of
approximately $343.5 million existed for the BLM in potential
reclamation costs.120 Despite such clear data as far back as 2001, the BLM
still has neither substantially modified nor eliminated its practice of
issuing nationwide bonds. The Department of the Interior did not even
contemplate the eradication of nationwide bonds in its 2001
recommendations to the BLM and Bureau of Indian Affairs.121 As the oil
and gas industry in the U.S. has expanded immensely in the last 25 years,
116. See id. (detailing that an operator with 100 or more wells may aggregate
the bond amount into a blanket bond covering all wells for the price of $250,000).
Based on Carbon Tracker data indicating that the federal average cost for a
regulator to reclaim a well is at least $20,000, the Texas blanket bond mechanism
would only pay for 12.5 wells, reclaimed in full. This would still leave over 85
abandoned wells to leak methane into the environment, exacerbating the climate
change issue and placing an even heavier burden on taxpayers to cover the unpaid
costs associated with P&A. See It’s Closing Time: The Huge Bill to Abandon
Oilfields Comes Early, supra note 114.
117. See 055.0001.3 WYO. CODE R. § 4(b)(i)((B) (LexisNexis 2020).
118. See id. § 4(b)(i)(A)–(C); see also 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.78(g)(1)(A).
119. OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, Report No. 01-I-421,
SELECTED ACTIVITIES ON BONDING FOR OIL AND GAS LEASES ON INDIAN TRUST
LANDS 6 (2001), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-DOI-IGREPORTS01-i-421/pdf/GPO-DOI-IGREPORTS-01-i-421.pdf [https://perma.cc/2NG6-CFSW].
120. See id.
121. See id. at 6–7.
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such bonding policies have required the BLM and taxpayers to take on the
P&A liabilities of several bankrupt oil companies as oil’s boom-and-bust
nature continues.122 At the very least, if nationwide bonds continue to be
available, they should have much stricter regulations such as maximum
numbers of covered wells and creditworthiness requirements for continued
eligibility.
Federally implemented statewide bonds pose the same, if not even
greater, risks as nationwide bonds. As of 2010, the BLM held 2,552
statewide bonds and 393 nationwide bonds.123 While most statewide bonds
do not cover as many wells as a typical nationwide bond, this high volume
of statewide bonds creates immense risk. Even if each of these bonds
ultimately required the BLM to incur the expense of decommissioning one
abandoned well, the resulting cost to federal taxpayers would likely exceed
$5 million.124 Accordingly, a more thorough and critical reevaluation is
needed to determine whether continuation of the current statewide bonds
provides adequate protection against newly orphaned wells.
B. Bankruptcy Laws Should Prioritize Well-Plugging Obligations
Congress could also reform the Bankruptcy Code to help reduce the
nation’s growing orphaned-oil-well problem. Currently, the bankruptcy
process prioritizes the restructuring of an oil company’s assets over
settling claims against the company for its environmental liabilities and
liens. Under this prioritization approach, the oil company’s creditors may
recover more on their claims while the company’s environmental
liabilities are forced upon the state or federal government. With this
structure, the financial risks associated with oil-well decommissioning in
a boom-and-bust economy often lie more with the regulators and taxpayers
than with the oil companies themselves.
If higher priority in bankruptcy was given to environmental
remediation and well-plugging obligations, oil companies could be held
responsible for excessive risk-taking that results in abandoned wells. Upon
122. See BLM Oil and Gas Bonding Rules Leave Lands a Mess and Taxpayers
Responsible, W. ORG. RES. COUNCIL, shttp://www.worc.org/media/2020.04-Oiland-Gas-Bonding-Federal-vs-State-sm2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NM8D-4NWS]
(last visited Oct. 7, 2021).
123. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-10-245, OIL AND GAS BONDS:
BONDING REQUIREMENTS AND BLM EXPENDITURES TO RECLAIM ORPHANED
WELLS 35 (2010), https://www.gao.gov/assets/310/300218.pdf [https://perma
.cc/LRU7-LA78].
124. Even assuming a very low P&A cost of just $2,000 per well, the total cost
would be (2,552 wells)*($2,000 per well) = $5,104,000.
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filing a bankruptcy petition, oil companies often cannot be held fully liable
for cleaning up well sites or capping abandoned wells.125 If bankruptcy
courts prioritized well-decommissioning obligations above most other
claims, state and federal agencies could better ensure bankrupt companies
assume those environmental liabilities. Amending Chapter 11 section 503
of the Bankruptcy Code could prioritize oil-well decommissioning and
certain other specified types of environmental remediation obligations and
create such enhanced enforcement through the administrative priority
process.126 Even a less aggressive Bankruptcy Code amendment through
Chapter 11 section 554(a) that merely increases judges’ discretion to
prioritize the satisfaction of debtors’ environmental obligations would
help to address this problem.127
1. Environmental Liens in Oil and Gas Bankruptcy Proceedings
Should Have Highest Priority
Oil companies’ obligations to reimburse the costs incurred by state
and federal government entities to fulfill neglected P&A obligations
should also receive higher priority in bankruptcy proceedings. Existing
Bankruptcy Code provisions do not afford super-priority to liens for wellremediation costs. The Code gives federal tax liens enhanced priority, yet
provides no such advantage to the BLM for its claims seeking recovery of
P&A costs. At the state level, such remediation liens do not receive
priority until the post-petition stage because the state can argue the
expenses are administrative liens or relate to work that increased a parcel’s
value and should thus be reimbursable.128
Ideally, government agencies seeking reimbursement of P&A costs
for orphaned wells would be entitled to administrative expense priority for
such claims from the beginning of an oil company’s filing for bankruptcy.
125. Under the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provisions, which halt any
enforcement of liens or judgments unless otherwise permitted, enforcing the use
of a bond to recover polluted lands is permissible only if the state effectively
argues that it is exercising police and regulatory power. Outside of that context,
the exception to the automatic stay provisions that enables bond money to be used
for its actual purpose rather than going to the estate is often not available. See
Safety-Kleen, Inc. (Pinewood) v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846, 864–66 (4th Cir. 2001).
126. See 11 U.S.C. § 503 (speaking to the requirements for filing an
administrative expense claim to recoup costs expended to preserve an estate).
127. See id. § 554(a) (addressing how a trustee may abandon property of an
estate if it is burdensome to the estate).
128. See In re Am. Coastal Energy Inc., 399 B.R. 805, 811 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2009).
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Presently, agencies may only request such administrative priority through
a filing after the bankruptcy proceeding is already underway. Today, a
state agency’s claim to recover costs of plugging wells for an insolvent oil
company during a bankruptcy proceeding is typically unsecured.129 To
enable these claims to qualify for administrative expense priority under
the Bankruptcy Code, state legislatures must update statutory laws to
specify that compliance requirements exist even before bankruptcy
petition filings and stipulate that non-compliant wells have long-term
environmental effects exceeding present financial constraints.130 The
“from the moment of filing” structure and resulting higher priority would
help make it more difficult for oil companies to discharge wellremediation-related claims in bankruptcy.131
Existing allowances for post-petition priority under the Bankruptcy
Code offer a possible avenue for gaining priority but are ultimately
insufficient to ensure oil companies bear their decommissioning
obligations. Under today’s post-petition priority rules, a state agency may
file P&A obligations as an administrative expense and potentially receive
priority status for certain liens as a later creditor in bankruptcy.132 These
liens may relate to the remediation costs already incurred by the state and
attach to the property underlying the remediated site or to the equipment
129. See id. at 807.
130. See id. (holding that an oil company’s obligation to expend funds to bring
the estate into compliance with state health and safety law is not contingent upon
whether the obligation arose before or after the bankruptcy filing and noting that,
because state law imposes a continuing duty to plug the wells at issue and thereby
makes expenditures necessary to conform with those laws actual and necessary
costs of preserving the estate, such obligations are entitled to administrative
expense priority).
131. An alternative way to address under-bonding risks and to prevent oil
companies from evading decommissioning obligations through bankruptcy would
be to create a government-supported insurance policy program and require oil
companies to purchase such insurance as a condition to receiving well permit
approvals. Such a requirement could specify how to calculate the required amount
of insurance based on the number of permitted wells, the ages and types of the
wells, and other factors. As other commentators have noted, these insurance plans
would ensure that, if a company files for bankruptcy, government agencies could
still recover reimbursements for decommissioning costs. See David A. Dana &
Hannah J. Wiseman, A Market Approach to Regulating the Energy Revolution:
Assurance Bonds, Insurance, and the Certain and Uncertain Risks of Hydraulic
Fracturing, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1523, 1593 (2014); see also Hager & Shaw, supra
note 72.
132. See In re ATP Oil & Gas Corp., No. 12-36187, 2013 WL 3157567
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 19, 2013).
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left on the site.133 In these situations, however, the state restoration lien
may only allow for recovery of the value added to the real property through
reclamation of the site.134 While these types of environmental liens are a
commendable start, they rarely allow for full recovery of an agency’s
actual capping cost.135 Providing for guaranteed administrative priority
would thus more effectively ensure the recovery of P&A costs by
establishing a perfected lien against the bankrupt party.136 Accordingly,
even states that already award post-petition administrative expense
priority for P&A costs should also designate claims seeking
reimbursement of such costs as receiving pre-petition administrative
priority.137
Greater prioritization of P&A-cost liabilities could also be provided
through codified changes to Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code that will
establish general statutory priority for environmental remediation and
climate-change-related obligations over financial considerations.
Codifying such priority rules for environmental claims would enable
judges and trustees to advocate for more favorable treatment of a wider
range of environmental claims, including those for oil-welldecommissioning costs. The Bankruptcy Code’s current structure pushes
P&A expenses onto government agencies with a hope that through civil
remedies and fines they may recoup their costs post-bankruptcy petition.138
If Bankruptcy Code provisions were amended to require that judges
incorporate climate-related environmental issues into their decisions, these
agencies would have a greater likelihood of actually recovering the full
costs they expend to cap orphaned wells.
Amending the Bankruptcy Code to reclassify unfulfilled oil-wellremediation obligations as fines rather than debts would be another way to
hold oil companies accountable for orphaned wells. Claims for expenses
incurred by government agencies that plug abandoned wells are currently
classified as dischargeable debts.139 However, if Congress revised Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code to classify such expenses as fines and penalties
for preserving the estate, the trustee would be unable to discharge those
debts and would need to ensure repayment through the liquidation or
133. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 38-08-04.8–.9, .12 (2021).
134. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1206 (2021).
135. See Hager & Shaw, supra note 72.
136. See In re Nordyke, 43 B.R. 856, 863–64 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984).
137. See In re Am. Coastal Energy Inc., 399 B.R. 805, 811 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2009).
138. See Trawick, supra note 66, 405–06.
139. Id. at 385; see also In re Nat’l Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 1992).
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restructuring process.140 Such revisions would codify a new standard for
bankruptcy judges and replace the array of conflicting holdings currently
plaguing this issue.141
2. Creating Policy That Reconciles Environmental Statutes with the
Bankruptcy Code
Lastly, Congress could amend the Bankruptcy Code to provide judges
clearer guidelines for resolving conflicts between environmental statutes
and the Code. These conflicts have historically fueled inconsistencies and
confusion in their application, which hampers environmental enforcement
against oil companies. As a public policy matter, conserving oil and gas
and consistently enforcing the duties and obligations of oil- and gas-well
operators would promote greater economic stability, protect
environmental assets, and improve public health.142 However, the primary
focus of most bankruptcy trustees and judges is prioritizing the restructure
of companies to maintain their business operations. If judges were
expressly required under the Bankruptcy Code to prioritize public health
and environmental interests over business preservation, bankrupt oil
companies would be held more accountable for their excessive risks and
neglect of their P&A obligations.
One potential way to reconcile the public policy goal of well
remediation is through amendments to the public safety provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code. Under Chapter 11 section 544(a) of the Code, a trustee
may not abandon property if abandonment would interfere with state
statutes or regulations designed to protect public safety.143 This provision
dissuades companies from petitioning to abandon certain property if
public safety is threatened. Under this abandonment limitation, a bankrupt
party cannot abandon property, and creditors may not be paid until the
debtor develops conditions to adequately protect the public’s health and
safety.144 This provision is presently incompatible with environmental
policy concerns, however, because existing case law has not established
140. See Cumberland Farms v. Fla. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 116 F.3d 16 (1st Cir.
1997).
141. Compare In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1009–10 (2d Cir. 1991)
(finding that certain fines and penalties are not dischargeable claims), with In re
Exide Techs., 613 B.R. 79, 81 (Bankr. D. Del. 2020), appeal filed, No. 20-1858
(3d Cir. Apr. 23, 2020) (holding that fines and penalties were dischargeable
claims).
142. See Pro Gas, Inc. v. Har-Ken Oil Co., 883 S.W.2d 485, 487 (Ky. 1994).
143. Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t. Prot., 474 U.S. 494 (1986).
144. In re Venoco, LLC., 572 B.R. 105 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017).
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that climate change, methane emissions, or abandoned wells constitute an
“imminent and identifiable harm.”145
Until Congress amends the Bankruptcy Code to expressly afford
higher priority to oil-well decommissioning and other environmental
remediation claims, judicial decisions could gradually elevate the
importance of environmental issues. Methane emissions pose a significant
danger to the public, and when a debtor’s estate contains uncapped wells,
the debtor is noncompliant with those regulations and endangers the public
and the environment.146 Following this rationale, judges could limit those
dangers by treating climate change mitigation as a more important factor
in bankruptcy proceedings. All state and federal laws require inactive
wells to be capped after a period of time, and as failure to do so violates
those laws in ways that threaten public safety, this topic arguably deserves
heightened attention in bankruptcy proceedings.147 Advancing such
arguments in bankruptcy case law could be an additional way to help move
the needle toward more consistent and effective enforcement against well
abandonment by insolvent oil companies.
CONCLUSION
Oil-well abandonments have been rapidly increasing across the U.S.
and could escalate further in the coming years as electrification of the
nation’s transportation system gradually reduces oil and gas demand.
Unless governments find better ways to deter oil-well abandonments,
harmful methane emissions from orphaned wells will continue to rise.
Fortunately, as highlighted in this Article, there are policy strategies
available capable of confronting the nation’s growing orphaned-well
problem. Any optimal set of policies aimed at reducing well abandonment
needs two main features: (1) the policies must collect much larger
payments from oil companies up front while still solvent to fund the
capping of abandoned wells, and (2) the policies must also make it more
difficult for oil companies to escape well-plugging obligations through
bankruptcy protections. Achieving such reforms will be difficult given the
145. See id. at 114–15 (holding that “abandonment power is not to be fettered
by laws or regulations not calculated to protect the public health or safety from
imminent and identifiable harm” and that, if no evidence is provided showing how
the presence of certain materials can or will affect the public health or safety, a
finding of imminent harm will not be made).
146. See Pro Gas, Inc., 883 S.W.2d at 487.
147. See In re Am. Coastal Energy Inc., 399 B.R. 805, 811 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2009) (holding that debtors in possession must manage the bankruptcy estate in
compliance with state and federal environmental and safety laws).
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oil industry’s formidable political strength and long history of influence
on its own regulatory structure. However, with renewable energy
technologies and electric vehicles becoming ever-more affordable and
popular, there has never been a better time to pursue these changes. By
aggressively remediating existing orphaned-oil wells and preventing
additional well abandonments, today’s policymakers can advance the
nation toward a day when former oil-well sites are nothing more than
innocuous relics of a distant past.

